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A  Note  on  the Existence  of  Starting
Point Bias  in Iterative
Bidding  Games
Karl C.  Samples
This  note  further  illuminates  the strength  and  direction  of  starting point  bias  in iterative
bidding procedures.  Conflicting recent findings  concerning  the starting point  bias phenomenon
are  first briefly  overviewed.  The  hypothesis  that  starting  values  influence  valuations  obtained
in  iterative  bidding  games  is  then  tested  in  an  experimental  setting  using  widely  disparate
starting  values  ranging  from  $1  to  $8,000.  Statistically  significant  differences  in  mean  final
bidding  outcomes  were  consistently  detected  in  games  using  different  starting  values.  This
evidence,  combined  with  test  results  reported  elsewhere,  strongly  suggests  that  starting  point
value selection  can  have subtle but significant  effects  on observed  final  bids.
The  purpose  of  this  note  is  to  further
illuminate  the  strength  and  direction  of
starting  point  bias  in  iterative  bidding
procedures.  To  date,  most  experiments
concerning  starting  point bias in iterative
bidding  games  have  focused  on  compar-
ing responses using relatively similar start-
ing values ($1 versus $10,  $25 versus $125,
or  $1  versus $50).  This  study has pursued
the  matter  one  step  further  by  using
widely disparate starting values ($1  versus
$800,  and  $1  versus  $8,000).  This  ap-
proach allows biases  to be detected which
may be  otherwise  overwhelmed  by  other
influential  survey  design  factors  such  as
choice  of  payment  vehicle  or  sample  se-
lection.  Statistically  significant differences
in mean  final  bidding outcomes were de-
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tected  in  games  using  different  starting
values.  This evidence, combined  with test
results already  reported by other  authors,
strongly  suggests  that  values  selected  to
initiate bidding games can have an appre-
ciable impact  on observed  final  bids.
Research on iterative bidding games has
examined various sources and direction of
biases associated  with the method.  Partic-
ular  attention  has  been  devoted  to mea-
suring  whether  inherent  structural  char-
acteristics of bidding procedures, including
selection  of  starting  bid  values,  signifi-
cantly  influence bidding outcomes.  Rowe
et al. hypothesized that selection  of start-
ing  value  may  affect  iterative  bidding
game results through a combination  of two
effects:  (1) if the starting value is far away
from the true bid value,  the iterative bid-
ding process may fatigue or exasperate the
respondent,  thereby  providing  incentive
to terminate  the game  before the true fi-
nal  bid  amount  is  reached,  and  (2)  the
starting  value  conveys  information  to  re-
spondents  about  expected  or  reasonable
bids and  thereby  influences  the  final  bid
outcome.'  These  two sources  of bids  can
1Brookshire  et al.  (1974)  were  perhaps  the  first  to
explicitly  recognize the starting point  bias phenom-
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be  called  the exasperation  effect  and the
information  transfer effect.
Rowe  et al.  tested  the  effects  of  using
three bidding starting values  ($1,  $5,  $10)
in willingness-to-pay  (WTP)  and willing-
ness-to-accept-compensation  (WTAC)
question  formats.  The impact  of  starting
bids on final bidding outcomes  was  tested
by estimating  two separate  bid  curves  to
explain  variation  in  observed  WTP  and
WTAC  final  reported  bids.  In  both  the
WTAC  and  WTP  regressions,  estimated
coefficients  associated  with  starting value
variables were positive, indicating a direct
relationship  between  final  bids  and  start-
ing bids.  However, only the starting value
term appearing in the WTP bid equation
was  statistically  significant  at  the  0.10
level.
Thayer experimented  with  $1  and  $10
starting  values  using  WTP  question  for-
mats. Mean  final bids for alternative start-
ing values  were compared using  one-way
analysis  of  variance.  Although  they were
not  shown  to  be  significantly  different,
mean final bids were found to be inversely
related  to  starting  values  used  to initiate
the bidding process.
Brookshire et al. (1981) tested for start-
ing  point  bias  in bidding  games  used  to
measure willingness to pay for air quality
improvements.  Three  starting values  ($1,
$10, $50)  were experimented  with.  Mean
final bids obtained for  12 residential areas
were  compared.  A  total  of  36  pairwise
t-tests of differences  between  means were
conducted.  In 30 of the tests  (83 percent),
the  hypotheses  that  the  mean  bids  were
the same could not be rejected  at the 0.10
level.
More  recently,  Desvousges  et  al.  re-
enon.  The  bidding  procedure  they  employed  in-
volved  raising  bids  of  $1  rather than  by the  more
traditional  25  cent  increments.  This  was  done  to
help  ameliorate  the  exasperation  effect  by  more
rapidly reaching  the final  bid  amount.  No  explicit
tests  of  starting  point  bias  were  reported  by  the
authors.
ported  detecting  starting  point  bias  in  a
study  of  option  prices  and  user  benefits
associated  with  discrete  water  quality
changes.  Two starting  values  ($25,  $125)
were experimented  with in WTP bidding
game question formats.  Research  findings
indicated that mean user benefits were 4.6
to  5.5  times  higher  when  starting  values
of $125 rather  than $25  were used to ini-
tiate the bidding procedure.  A positive re-
lationship  between  mean  final  bidding
outcomes  and starting  values  was  consis-
tently observed.  However,  statistical  test-
ing  to  detect  differences  between  mean
bidding outcomes yielded inconclusive  re-
sults.
Further Empirical Evidence
Further testing of starting point bias was
conducted  in  the  context  of  an  experi-
mental study of  marine recreational  fish-
ing valuation in Hawaii. 2 A sample of  100
offshore sport fishermen  was randomly se-
lected  to  participate  in  personal  inter-
views  conducted  by  professional  market
research interviewers.  This group was fur-
ther randomly  assigned  into  two subsam-
ples,  each  comprising  50  anglers.  Anglers
comprising  Subsample  I  were  queried
about their willingness to pay a daily fuel
tax  and  their  willingness  to  accept  com-
pensation  not to  fish for a  day.3 An itera-
tive bidding  procedure  was  used  to elicit
2A  complete  description  of  survey  procedures  and
results  can be  found in SMS  Research.
3 The exact  wording  of the questions is  as follows:
"Suppose that you were going to fill up your boat's
fuel tank  to go  out  fishing  the  next  day.  You hear
that  a  new  tax  has  been  placed  on  fuel  used  for
sportfishing.  Would  you go  ahead and buy the fuel
so that you could go  fishing if the tax  increased  the
cost  of fishing  trip by $  ?"
"Finally,  imagine  that  the  day  before  you  are
planning  to  go  offshore  sportfishing,  you  find  out
that all sportfishing  trips for the next day will have
to be  cancelled  because  of top  secret  Navy opera-
tions. However,  you will get a cash reward to make
up for  the  trouble  caused  you.  Would  you  be  sat-
isfied  with  a cash  reward  of  $  if  you could
not  go offshore  sportfishing  as planned?"
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these  values.  The  questionnaire  instru-
ment was designed such that the sequenc-
ing  of  the  two  bidding  games  was  un-
changed  for  all  respondents.  First  the
WTP bidding game  was  played followed
by  the  WTAC  game.  Although  this  pro-
cedure simplified the interview  process, it
could  have  possibly  introduced  a  source
of bias in anglers'  responses to the WTAC
question. The extent of this bias would de-
pend  on whether  knowledge  obtained  in
the initial  WTP  bidding  game  was  used
by  anglers  to  modify  their bidding  strat-
egies  in  the  subsequent  WTAC  game.
However, due to significant differences in
WTP and  WTAC  question  formats,  com-
bined with the lack of opportunity for an-
glers to learn how to influence the bidding
process,  it  was  anticipated  this  strategic
role  playing  behavior  would be  inconse-
quential in terms of influencing final bid-
ding outcomes.
For  half  of  Subsample  I,  the  bidding
procedure  for both the WTP and  WTAC
question formats began at a starting value
of  $1.  The  remaining  25  anglers  in  Sub-
sample  I began  the bidding  procedure  at
a starting value of $800. Selection of these
starting  values  was  guided  by  two  inter-
related  concerns.  First,  there  was the  de-
sire  to select  values  such that their  range
accommodated  all  anglers'  true  valua-
tions.  Selection  of sufficiently  wide  value
ranges  would  presumably  eliminate  the
problem  of  having  to  curtail  bidding
games prematurely  due to structural  con-
straints on available  bidding options.  Un-
fortunately,  no  prior  studies  of  Hawaii
offshore  recreational  fishing  have  been
conducted  to date that might serve  to in-
dicate  the  range  of  anglers'  valuations
which  might expectedly  be  encountered.
For  this reason,  estimates  of  angler  con-
sumer surpluses  reported for  other locali-
ties  were  used  as  guides.  The need  to  se-
lect a wide enough initial value range was
conditioned  by a second concern  to select
starting  bids that were realistic  to respon-
dents.  Based on comments made by other
34
bidding game experimenters,  it was antic-
ipated  that  excessively  low  and high  ini-
tial  bid  values  could  adversely  affect  the
perceived  credibility  of the  hypothetical
valuation  scenarios  being used.  As  a  con-
sequence, anglers might not accurately re-
veal  their true  valuations during  the bid-
ding game  process.
No  attempt  was  made  to  formulate  a
formal testable hypothesis concerning  the
perceived  realism  of starting  values  used
here.  This  leaves  open  the  question  of
whether the  bidding  results  were  signifi-
cantly  influenced  by  use of widely dispa-
rate  initial bid amounts.  As  suggested be-
low,  there is evidence  that starting  values
did at least have an effect on anglers'  will-
ingness to respond with positive final bids.
Due to  interview  time  constraints,  and
the  desire  to  minimize  the  exasperation
effect,  a maximum  of  five bidding  itera-
tions  were  allowed  for  each  question.  A
strict bidding scheme that accommodated
the iteration constraint was developed and
adhered  to  (see  Figure  1).  The  bidding
process  could  be  described  as  oscillatory
because  it  converged  on  a  final bid from
both directions.  As such the procedure dif-
fered  from  earlier  bidding  games  where
unidirectional  increments (or decrements)
in bids were used. While it is possible that
large  swings  in  bids  may  have  confused
or annoyed respondents, this was not tested
for.  A  clear  advantage  of  the  scheme,
however,  was  that apart  from differences
in the starting  bid,  the bidding  sequence
was exactly the same for $1 and $800 bids.
Consequently,  the  "information  transfer
effect"  could be related directly to the ini-
tial bid amount, rather than to the overall
bidding process.
Within  this bidding  structure,  final re-
ported bids were  generally  constrained to
lie  between  $775  and  $25.  Exceptions  to
this  occurred  when  the  bidding  process
ended prematurely  at the first bidding it-
eration.  For example,  if  in  a WTP  ques-
tion a respondent stated "yes"  to a starting
value of $800, then  $800 was recorded  as
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Figure 1.  Bidding Scheme  Followed  for the "Willingness-to-Pay"  Question Format Using  $1
and $800  Starting Bid  Values. 8
their final bid. Similarly, if an angler stat-
ed "no"  to a starting  value of  $1,  then $1
was  recorded  as  the  final bid.  However,
before  the  bid was  recorded,  a  determi-
nation  was  made  through  subsequent
questioning  whether  the  respondent  was
actually  refusing  to  play  the  game.  In
WTAC question formats, the opposite held
true.  Final  bids  of  $800  were  recorded
when a respondent  stated "no"  to a start-
ing bid  of  $800, and  final bids of  $1  were
recorded  when  anglers  expressed  a will-
ingness to accept  a starting bid of $1.
Anglers comprising  Subsample  II  were
queried  about their willingness  to pay an
annual  user  fee,  and  their  willingness  to
accept  compensation  not to fish for a  sea-
son.4 An  iterative  bidding  procedure  was
4 The  exact wording  of  the questions  is as  follows:
"Suppose that the Federal Government  just passed
a law that required  all  boat users  to pay an annual
employed  and  again  the  sequencing  of
questions was kept uniform for all anglers
in the subsample. The starting values used
were  $1  and  $8,000.  Both values  were se-
lected  to accommodate  the concerns  dis-
cussed  above.  A higher  initial bid ($8,000
versus  $800)  was  used  because  a  fishing
season  was  being  valued  rather  than  an
individual  fishing  trip.  The bidding  pro-
cedure  was  limited to  five iterations,  and
followed  the  plan given  in Figure  1 with
the exception  that all bids  (other than $1)
were an  order of magnitude greater.
user  fee.  Would  you go  ahead and  pay the  annual
tax  so that you could  go  offshore fishing  in  1983  if
the  amount  which  you  had  to  pay  was  set  at
$  ?"
"Finally,  suppose  that the  government  asked  you
to stop  fishing  for  the  rest  of  1983.  In  return,  you
will receive a cash award.  Would  you go  along and
not  go  offshore  fishing  in  1983  if  the  cash  award
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TABLE  1.  Number  of Respondents  Refusing  to Answer or Reporting $0  Bids for Alternative
Question  Formats.
Subsample  Question  Format  Refusals  $0 Bids  Refusals  $0  Bids
Starting  Bid  = $1  Starting  Bid = $800
I  Willingness to Pay  Daily Fuel Tax  2  2  10  1
N = 25
I  Willingness to Accept  Payment Not to  5  2  6  1
Fish for Day
N  = 25
Starting  Bid  = $1  Starting  Bid = $8,000
II  Willingness to Pay Annual  User Fee  5  0  18  2
N  = 25
II  Willingness to Accept Payment Not to  8  0  8  0
Fish for a Year
N  = 25
During  the  actual  fielding  of  the  var-
ious  bidding  games,  many  anglers  ex-
pressed  reluctance  to  engage  in  the  bid-
ding  activity.  To  a  lesser  extent,  other
anglers  stated  emphatically  that  they
would pay or receive  nothing  ($0). It was
subsequently  determined  through  ques-
tioning whether such bids were legitimate
$0 bids,  or protest  bids.  Protest bids  were
treated  as  nonresponses.  Anglers  who re-
sponded with  legitimate  $0 bids  were  as-
signed a final bid value of $0. Anglers who
refused  to answer  a  given  question  were
not considered legitimate observations  for
that  particular  question.  The  number  of
anglers in both of these categories differed
depending on the specific question format
and  starting  value  used  (Table  1).  High
starting values  used in WTP question for-
mats appear to have discouraged  or alien-
ated the most respondents as evidenced by
the relatively  high  refusal  rates for  these
questions.  This  finding  is  important  be-
cause it indicates that selection of starting
TABLE 2.  Final Bid Outcomes  for Different Starting Values: All Respondents  Except Refusals.
Calculated
Sub-  Standard  Standard  T-Valueb
sam-  Mean Bida  Deviation  Mean  Bid  Deviation  Ho:
pie  Question  Format  (X1)  (S1)  (X2)  (S2)  X1  = X2
Starting  Bid = $1  Starting  Bid  = $800
I  Willingness to Pay  Daily Fuel  $9 (23)  $19  $90 (15)  $198  1.96*
Tax
I  Willingness to Accept Pay-  $189 (20)  $204  $667 (19)  $297  5.88**
ment  Not to Fish for Day
Starting  Bid = $1  Starting  Bid  = $8,000
II  Willingness to Pay Annual  $42 (20)  $179  $1,428 (7)  $2,918  2.19**
User  Fee
II  Willingness to Accept  Pay-  $5,176 (17)  $2,521  $6,902 (17)  $2,607  1.96*
ment Not  to Fish for a Year
Number of observations used to calculate means  given in parentheses.
bT = [(X1  - X2)/(N1  - 1)(S12) + (N2 - 1)(22)][(N1*N2)(N1  + N2 - 2)]/(N1  + N2).
*  Indicates significant  at the 0.10 level.
**  Indicates significant  at the 0.05 level.
36
July 1985Starting Point Bias in Bidding Games
bids may do more than just influence  final
observed  bids. It may also lead to outright
rejection  of  the  hypothetical  market  sce-
nario  by  respondents.  Another  factor  in-
fluencing  refusal  rates  was  question  for-
mat.  Questions  aimed  at  determining
annual  WTP  and  WTAC  consistently
drew  more  refusals  to  answer  than  ques-
tions  concerned  with  marginal  (daily)
WTP or WTAC. Perhaps this is due to the
fact that respondents  perceived it less risky
to incorrectly  value a day  of fishing  com-
pared to incorrectly valuing an entire year
of  fishing.  If  so,  respondents  would  tend
to be  relatively  less interested  in  playing
the  annual  WTP  or  WTAC  bidding
games.  Furthermore,  the  perceived  real-
ism of valuing a year of fishing is probably
less than trying to  value a  fishing day.
Statistical  results  of four bidding game
outcomes  are given in Table 2. Mean final
bids  were  observed  to  be  considerably
higher for WTAC  question formats when
compared  to WTP responses.  This  is con-
sistent with findings reported elsewhere by
Rowe  et al.,  Bishop  and  Heberlein,  and
others.  As  might be  expected,  mean  bids
observed for both WTP and WTAC ques-
tions  were  lower  for  Subsample  I  (daily
use values)  than for Subsample  II (annual
use  values).
To  measure  the  effect  of  starting  bid
values  on  final  bidding  outcomes,  four
pairwise  t-tests were  conducted  to  detect
statistically  significant  differences  be-
tween  mean  final  bids  for  alternative
starting  values.  Test  results  are  given  in
Table 2.  For all four question formats, the
hypothesis  was rejected  at  the 90%  confi-
dence  level that the mean  final bids were
the  same regardless  of starting  bid value.
Significantly  higher mean  bids  were  con-
sistently  observed  for  higher  initial  bid
values.  Relative  differences  in  mean  bid
outcomes  were  most  perceptible  in  the
WTP question formats. For these question
formats,  mean  final  bids  were  10  to  34
times greater for the higher starting  bids.
On  the  other  hand,  mean  final  bids  ob-
served  for the  WTAC  questions  differed
by a  factor of  1.3  to 3.5.
The statistical  relationship  between  ob-
served  final  bids  and  starting  bid  values
was  also  examined  by  estimating  bid
curves  for  alternative  question  formats.
Four separate  bid curves  were  estimated
using  ordinary  least  squares  regression
(Table  3).  Inclusion  of  explanatory  vari-
ables such as family income, age and fish-
ing frequency  permitted  a determination
to  be  made  of the  impact  of starting  bid
selection  on  final  bids, holding  other  po-
tentially relevant factors constant. Regres-
sion  results  consistently  showed  positive
coefficients  for  the  starting bid variables.
In  all equations  except  the estimated  bid
curve for a daily fuel tax, the starting bid
variable was significant  at the 0.05  level.
While  analysis  of  variance  results  sug-
gests that  a significant  positive  link exists
between  starting  bids  and  final  bidding
outcomes,  the  underlying  cause  of  the
phenomenon  is  not  yet  evident.  Further
data analysis was conducted to investigate
the  information  transfer  effect,  and  how
it  may  bias  observed  bids.  Both  Thayer
and  Rowe  et al. have  argued  that  initial
bids  may  influence  respondents'  percep-
tion  of  legitimate  final  bids.  An  extreme
of this situation  is  where  respondents  ac-
cept the starting bid as their final bid. The
probability seems low that a randomly se-
lected  respondent  would  have  a true val-
uation  exactly  equal  to the  starting  bid.
Therefore, when a respondent's stated bid
equals the starting bid, it would seem that
either the respondent  is  excessively  coop-
erative, or the information  transfer effect
is profoundly strong.
For  all  question  formats,  a  count  was
made  of the  bids for  which  the  final  bid
equaled  the starting  bid. These bids were
then  removed  and  the  mean  bids  reesti-
mated  for  all  question  formats  and start-
ing values.  The  results showed that out of
a  total of  200  bidding  games  played,  76
games  (38%)  resulted  in  final  bids equal-
ling starting bids (Table 4).  This outcome
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was  observed  most  frequently  in  games
using  $1  starting  values.  Choice  of ques-
tion format  also appeared  to be a relevant
factor.  In WTP questions,  95%  of the cases
where  final  bid  equalled  initial  bid,  the
starting bid was $1. Conversely, in WTAC
questions,  74% of the cases involved either
$800  or  $8,000  starting  bids.  Overall,
however,  the  phenomenon  was  observed
with nearly  the  same  frequency  in  WTP
and WTAC question formats. It was found
that only 6 respondents  out of the sample
of 100 reported final bids equal to starting
bids for both bidding games they played.
These respondents  were therefore respon-
sible for 12 (16%)  of the 76 instances where
the phenomenon  was observed.  This  sug-
gests  that the  phenomenon  is  not  simply
a sampling peculiarity.
Recalculated  mean  bids  were  less  di-
vergent  for  alternative  starting  values.
Furthermore,  in  all but one  question  for-
mat, revised mean  bids for larger  starting
values  were  less  than  revised  mean  bids
for  $1  starting  values.  A  positive relation-
ship between  starting  bid and  final mean
bids was therefore not evident. Again, four
pairwise  t-tests  were conducted  to detect
statistically  significant  differences  be-
tween  revised  mean  final  bids  for  alter-
native  starting  value.  Only  the  revised
mean bids for the annual WTAC question
could be  shown to  be  significantly  differ-
ent  from  each  other  at  the  0.10  level  of
significance.
Discussion  and Conclusion
Selection  of  starting values  in iterative
bidding  games appears  to  influence  final
mean  bids  in  a variety  of  ways.  Starting
values seem to alter the perceived  realism
of the hypothetical  market being created,
and thereby influence refusal rates. There
also  appears to be  a link between  starting
values,  question  format  and  respondents'
acceptance  of  starting  bids  as  final  bids.
However,  even after  these factors  are ac-
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TABLE 4.  Final Bid Outcomes  for Different Starting Values:  Effect of Excluding Observations




Question  Format  Starting  Bid  tions  Revised Mean  Bida
Willingness  to Pay Daily Fuel Tax  $1  16  $29(7)
$800  1  $39 (14)
Willingness  to Accept  Payment Not to Fish  For Day  $1  8  $315 (12)
$800  15  $169 (4)
Willingness  to Pay Annual User  Fee  $1  19  $800 (1)
$8,000  1  $333 (6)
Willingness  to Accept  Payment Not to  Fish For Year  $1  2  $5,867 (15)
$8,000  14  $1,783  (3)
a Number of observations  used to calculate revised means given in parentheses.
still  alter  observed  mean  final  bids  in  a
statistically significant  manner.
All  these  effects  were  observed  in  this
study  which  incorporated  a  streamlined
bidding  procedure  to minimize  potential
exasperation  effects.  This finding suggests
that the information  transfer  effect  of  se-
lecting  a  certain  bidding  starting  point
may be more important than the exasper-
ation  effect  in  influencing  final  bid  out-
comes.
The  relationship  between  starting  bid
and  refusal  rate  is  an  especially  complex
issue that remains  unresolved.  Looking  at
Table  1, it is clear  that relatively  high re-
fusal  rates  were  associated  with  WTP
questions when large initial starting values
were  used.  If  individuals  who refused  to
play  the  bidding  game  were  also  those
with  low actual  valuations  of  the recrea-
tion  experience,  then  the  number  of  re-
fusals  would  be  inversely  related  to  esti-
mated  final  mean  bid  outcomes.  Given
that  this  appears  to  be  the  case  here,  it
can  be  hypothesized  that  high  starting
values  might  have  somehow  served  as  a
behavioral  cue  to  respondents  that  influ-
enced  their  willingness  to  participate  in
the game.  This is  an acute empirical  con-
cern  when  choice  of  a  starting  value
screens  out  a certain  class  of  respondents
whose  valuations  are  therefore  unrepre-
sented  in  final  mean  bid  calculations.
Conceivably, low starting bids may screen
out high-value  users. High initial bids may
discourage  low-value  respondents.  While
this phenomenon  is not tied directly to the
information  transfer effect, it may never-
theless lead  to biased value  estimates.
Taken  together,  the  results  presented
here suggest that the information  transfer
effect works in subtle, yet influential  ways.
The effect can  perhaps be ameliorated  by
obtaining  a reasonably  accurate  estimate
of the final mean  bid amount before  con-
ducting  final  field  interviews  using  itera-
tive  bidding  games.  A  simple  pretesting
procedure  using  an  open-ended  question
format  could  probably  suffice  to identify
confidence intervals  that encompass  most
users'  true valuations.  The  closer  the ini-
tial  bid  is  to  the  final  bid outcomes,  the
less  likely  that  starting  point  values  will
bias  final estimated  values  because  of re-
spondents'  refusal to  participate.  Pretest-
ing  does  not,  however,  overcome  the
problem  of  overly  cooperative  respon-
dents  who  accept any  initial  bid  as their
final bid. Finally, in view of the seemingly
positive relationship between final bids and
starting  values,  use  of  a  range  of starting
values within  a single survey should prob-
ably  be  encouraged.  In  this  way,  biases
associated  with  high  and  low  starting
points  can perhaps be internally compen-
sated  for.
39
SamplesWestern Journal of Agricultural Economics
References
Bishop,  R.  C. and T.  A. Heberlein.  "Measuring  Val-
ues of Extra Market  Goods:  Are Indirect  Measures
Biased?"  American Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, 61/5(1979):  926-30.
Brookshire,  D.  S.,  R.  D.  d'Arge,  W. D.  Schulze,  and
M.  A.  Thayer.  "Experiments  in  Valuing  Public
Goods."  In Advances in Applied Microeconomics,
V.  K. Smith (ed.).  JAI Press,  Inc., Greenwich,  1981.
Brookshire,  D.  S.,  B.  Ives,  and  W.  D.  Schulze.  "The
Valuation  of  Aesthetic  Preferences."  Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management,
3/4(1974):  325-46.
Desvousges,  W.  H.,  V.  K.  Smith,  and  M.  P.  Mc-
Givney. A  Comparison of Alternative Approaches
for Estimating Recreation and Related Benefits
of Water Quality Improvements. EPA-230-05-83-
001,  U.S.  Environmental  Protection  Agency,  Of-
fice  of Policy  Analysis,  Washington,  D.C.,  1983.
Rowe,  R.,  R.  C.  d'Arge,  and  D.  S. Brookshire.  "An
Experiment  on  the Economic  Value of Visibility."
Journal of Environmental Economics and Man-
agement, 7(1980):  1-19.
SMS  Research.  Experimental Valuation of  Recre-
ational  Fishing in  Hawaii: Final Report. Admin-
istrative  Report  H-83-11C,  National  Marine  Fish-
eries Service,  Southwest  Fisheries Center,  Honolulu
Laboratory,  Honolulu,  1983.
Thayer,  M.  A. "Contingent  Valuation  Techniques  for
Assessing Environmental  Impacts."  Journal of En-
vironmental  Economics  and  Management,
8/1(1981):  27-44.
40
July 1985